Probability segmenting and the social cost of draft evasion

Jonathan Lipow () and Jay Simon ()
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Jonathan Lipow: Defense Resources Management Institute
Jay Simon: Defense Resources Management Institute

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 1, 307-312

Abstract: While a number of papers have addressed the costs and benefits of conscription, only one paper - Warner and Negrussa (2005) - considers the social welfare costs that result from efforts to illegally evade the draft. In this note, we address legal draft evasion - in particular, the use by of personal social or political connections to gain access to "cushy" military assignments. To combat this phenomenon, we illustrate the use of a tool that we call "probability segmenting," essentially a form of draft lottery that at little cost should substantially reduce the number of cushy assignments and their associated social costs.

Keywords: conscription; evasion; lottery; probability segmenting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H5 J4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-14
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