Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction

Yizhaq Minchuk

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 3, 1665-1668

Abstract: We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.

Keywords: Asymmetry; all-pay auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-28
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