Union–firm bargaining agenda: right-to-manage or efficient bargaining?

Luciano Fanti

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 2, 936-948

Abstract: In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between parties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union's power is not too high.

Keywords: Efficient bargaining; Right-to-manage; Cournot duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J5 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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