A note on market power in bilateral oligopoly

Ludovic Julien ()

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 1, 400-406

Abstract: In this note we consider a simple bilateral oligopoly model of an exchange economy. We characterize the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and we explore the effectiveness of market power. We provide some measures of relative market power. We show it depends on the relative size of the market and on the ratio of price elasticities of supply. Finally, we study free entry. We show it does not always lead to the competitive equilibrium market outcome.

Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibrium; strategic market games; Lerner index. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-11
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Working Paper: A note on market power in bilateral oligopoly (2015)
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