Gender Beliefs and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

Jana Vyrastekova, Esther-Mirjam Sent () and Irene van Staveren ()

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 2, 1148-1153

Abstract: This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. The contributions to the public good are driven by gender beliefs, and after controlling for them, contributions do not depend on the gender group composition directly.

Keywords: gender beliefs; public goods experiment; gender differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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