Managerial Incentive Problems: The Role of Multiple Signals

Michiko Ogaku ()
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Michiko Ogaku: Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 1, 106-111

Abstract: Career concerns can mitigate moral hazard problems, but these diminish as the agent's retirement age approaches. Addressing this problem, this note draws attention to the role of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible signals.

Keywords: Career concerns; Moral hazard; Non-contractible signals; Contractible signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-11
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