A mechanism to pick the deserving winner

Anna Moskalenko

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 3, 1543-1549

Abstract: A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós'(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria.

Keywords: Implementation; mechanism design; subgame perfect equilibrium; individuals choosing among themselves; voting by veto. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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