Welfare analysis of civil servants' wage bargaining in a mixed-duopoly approach

Kazuki Hiraga ()
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Kazuki Hiraga: Tokai University

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 3, 1734-1743

Abstract: This research examines how wage regulation can be Pareto-improving. We demonstrate the wage regulation of public firms by relaxing the assumption of substitution between private and public goods. In other words, we admit a complementary relationship between private and public goods. Relaxing this assumption provides results both additional to and different from those produced by other models. We find that wage regulation can be Pareto-improving under a moderately strong complementary relationship between private and public goods.

Keywords: Wage regulation model; Pareto improvement; Complementary relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-01057

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