Pay-for-Performance, Reputation, and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision

Nadja Kairies ()
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Nadja Kairies: University of Duisburg-Essen

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 1, 702-715

Abstract: We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but, dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn raises patient benefits.

Keywords: altruism; performance; motivation; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I0 I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-22
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