The Portuguese high school match

Antonio Neto

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 3, 1765-1771

Abstract: School Choice Theory is one of the research areas in Economics that has an immediate application to reality: every year, thousands of students around the world have to enroll at a new school. This paper introduces the Portuguese School Matching Algorithm and analyzes its main properties. I show that (a) the Portuguese algorithm can be described almost as the deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm; (b) the constraint in terms of the number of schools parents can submit might harm the strategy-proof characteristic of the DA algorithm; (c) there are still several ways students can manipulate the system of priorities. Finally, I propose a new approach regarding the strategy-proof property by distinguishing between static-strategy-proof and dynamic-strategy-proof.

Keywords: Matching theory; school matching algorithm; high school (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-21
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