Direct income transfers and public good provisioning: choosing between two anti-poverty schemes

Diganta Mukherjee () and Sreenivasan Subramanian ()
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Diganta Mukherjee: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India
Sreenivasan Subramanian: ICSSR National Fellow, affiliated to Madras Institute of Development Studies

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 3, 1450-1458

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the economics of choosing between two types of anti-poverty programme: targeted direct income transfers and the universal provisioning of a public good. We construct a simple analytical model to examine the issue. As might be expected, our results suggest that the choice between the two poverty-alleviation schemes would depend on the relative strengths of the productivity of public goods investment on the one hand, and the information costs of targeting benefits, on the other.

Keywords: poverty; transfer; public good; budget (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 I3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-11
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