The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency

Mostapha Diss and William V. Gehrlein ()
Additional contact information
William V. Gehrlein: Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, 2418-2426

Abstract: We provide representations giving the Condorcet Efficiency of Weighted Scoring Rules in three-alternative elections by considering the Modified Impartial Anonymous Culture condition (MIAC). This assumption only considers voting situations for which all Weighted Scoring Rules do not elect the same winner. It is concluded that the selection of a voting rule has a clear impact on the resulting Condorcet Efficiency. This makes a significant difference in what can be concluded from earlier studies.

Keywords: Voting; Condorcet Efficiency; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-20
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I4-P242.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency (2015)
Working Paper: The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00391

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().