Nash Equilibria in a Two-Person Discrete All-Pay Auction with Unfair Tie-Break and Complete Information
Hironori Otsubo ()
Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, A245
This note provides a full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria in the two-person all-pay auction with discrete strategy space and complete information where bidders are treated differently in case of a tie. There exist a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. In some of these equilibria the bidder who loses in case of a tie is more likely to win the prize than the bidder who wins in case of a tie.
Keywords: All-pay auction; Complete information; Discrete strategy space; Unfair tie-breaking rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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