On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set

Francesc Llerena () and Llúcia Mauri ()
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Francesc Llerena: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Llúcia Mauri: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, 2475-2481

Abstract: In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989) with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991).

Keywords: cooperative games; Lorenz domination; imputation set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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