How privatization affects the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the case of international mixed duopoly

Kadohognon Ouattara

Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 2, 1038-1045

Abstract: This paper studies a mixed duopoly where a semi-public firm competes with a foreign private firm. The firm's owners have the option to hire a manager. A novel incentive scheme of semi-public firm's manager is utilized which takes into account the social goals of public authority. In contrast to the results in the existing literature, the paper shows that the decision to hire manager depends on the state-ownership share in the semi-public firm. Yet the paper finds that there exists an equilibrium in which only the semi-public firm hires a manager.

Keywords: MIXED OLIGOPOLY; FOREIGN PRIVATE FIRM; MANAGERIAL DELEGATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2016/Volume36/EB-16-V36-I2-P102.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00010

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().