The Effects of a Teacher Performance-Pay Program on Student Achievement: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

Yusuke Jinnai ()
Additional contact information
Yusuke Jinnai: International University of Japan

Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 2, 993-999

Abstract: This paper presents evidence from a regression-discontinuity analysis of a teacher performance-pay program, in which teachers are awarded an additional cash bonus for improving their students' achievement. Results show that teachers who failed to reach an expected benchmark for their students' achievement, resulting in no bonuses, performed significantly better in the subsequent year than those who reached this benchmark and thus received a bonus. This finding highlights that the presence of performance-pay incentives affects student achievement in future years by inducing more effort from teachers who failed in the present year. Moreover, the results demonstrate that such impact disappeared once the government repealed the pay scheme: another indication that teachers actively respond to monetary bonuses.

Keywords: School accountability; Performance pay; Teacher incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2016/Volume36/EB-16-V36-I2-P99.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00093

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().