Monetary policy decision making: the role of ideology, institutions and central bank independence

Cleomar Gomes Da Silva and Flavio Vieira

Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 4, 2051-2062

Abstract: The aim of this article is to evaluate whether variables related to partisan ideology, institutions and central bank independence play a role in monetary policy decision making. The annual panel data set includes 53 countries (advanced and emerging/developing economies) for the period 2001-2012. The estimation of several Taylor Rules, via system GMM dynamic panel data models, shows that the conduct of monetary policy seems not to be influenced by the factors mentioned above. The same result applies for the period after the global financial crisis.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank Independence; Ideology; Panel Data Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C5 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-09
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