Evolving assortativity and social conventions
Jiabin Wu ()
Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 2, 936-941
This paper considers a stochastic evolutionary model in which agents can vote for different policies through majority voting that induce different assortative matching patterns. We find that in coordination games, agents either vote for complete segregation policy or maximal integration policy. The Pareto-dominant social convention is always stochastically stable and it is possible that both risk-dominant and Pareto-dominant social conventions are stochastically stable. This contrasts to risk-dominant social convention being uniquely stochastically stable predicted in conventional stochastic stability analysis where matching is uniformly random.
Keywords: assortative matching; social conventions; majority voting; risk-dominance; pareto-dominance; evolutionary game theory; stochastic stability; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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