Technology improvement and market structure alteration
Sugata Marjit (),
Suryaprakash Misra () and
Dyuti Banerjee ()
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Sugata Marjit: Centre for Studies in Social Sciences (CSSSC), Kolkata, India
Suryaprakash Misra: National Law University, Delhi
Dyuti Banerjee: Monash University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Suryaprakash Mishra
Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 2, 1106-1112
In this paper we show that the increasing marginal cost assumption removes the infeasibility of market structure alteration that is present under the constant marginal cost assumption. Specifically, in an infinitely repeated game with increasing marginal cost, we show that technological improvement has the potential to switch the market structure from collusion to Cournot generating additional welfare gains.
Keywords: Infinitely Repeated Game; Market Structures; Technology. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00868
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