Technology improvement and market structure alteration

Sugata Marjit, Suryaprakash Misra () and Dyuti Banerjee ()
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Suryaprakash Misra: National Law University, Delhi
Dyuti Banerjee: Monash University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Suryaprakash Mishra

Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 2, 1106-1112

Abstract: In this paper we show that the increasing marginal cost assumption removes the infeasibility of market structure alteration that is present under the constant marginal cost assumption. Specifically, in an infinitely repeated game with increasing marginal cost, we show that technological improvement has the potential to switch the market structure from collusion to Cournot generating additional welfare gains.

Keywords: Infinitely Repeated Game; Market Structures; Technology. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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