On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives
Carmelo RodrÃguez-Ã lvarez ()
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Carmelo RodrÃguez-à lvarez: Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()
Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 3, 1966-1974
Abstract:
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà , Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives.
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness; Single-Peaked Preferences; Preferences over Sets of Alternatives; Minimally Extended Social Choice Functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08-31
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