On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives
Carmelo RodrÃguez-Ã lvarez ()
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Carmelo RodrÃguez-Ã lvarez: Instituto Complutense de AnÃ¡lisis EconÃ³mico
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()
Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 3, 1966-1974
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and BarberÃ , Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives.
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness; Single-Peaked Preferences; Preferences over Sets of Alternatives; Minimally Extended Social Choice Functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00196
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