Too many traders? On the welfare ranking of prices and quantities

Pauli Lappi

Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 3, 1959-1965

Abstract: This study conducts a welfare comparison of emission tax and emissions trading in a multi-period model, in which the regulation instruments are chosen through a political process and unregulated participants can trade in the permit market. It is found that under reasonable conditions a tax yields a higher welfare level than emissions trading.

Keywords: Emissions trading; Emission tax; Lobbying; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08-31
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