Risk aversion and prudence in contests
Marco Sahm ()
Additional contact information
Marco Sahm: University of Bamberg
Economics Bulletin, 2017, vol. 37, issue 2, 1122-1132
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two main results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agentsÂ´ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse.
Keywords: Tullock contest; risk aversion; prudence; downside risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00215
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Series data maintained by John P. Conley ().