Envy-free allocation of indivisible goods with money and externalities
Satoshi Nakada ()
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Satoshi Nakada: Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 1, 52-59
This paper considers an envy-free allocation of a single indivisible good in the quasi-linear utility environment where a monetary transfer is allowed and externalities among agents exist. We show that an envy-free allocation does not exist if a degree of the externalities is high enough and there are two groups of agents: one group of agents can but the other group of agents cannot enjoy externalities. We also show that both efficient allocations and envy-free allocations are generally incompatible whereas they are always compatible without externalities.
Keywords: envy-free allocation; indivisible goods; network; externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00267
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