Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism
Keiichi Morimoto ()
Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 1, 583-592
This study re-examines the optimal delegation problem of monetary policy under preference uncertainty of the central banker. Liberal central bankers are desirable when uncertainty is strong, which is emphasized when the slope of the Phillips curve is flatter, as some empirical works report. However, appointing conservative central bankers is optimal with standard parameter values when monetary policies are conducted by committees, as in most actual economies.
Keywords: monetary policy; delegation; uncertain preferences; committee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00989
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