Economic Motivations for Software Bug Bounties

Christopher Sprague () and Jeffrey Wagner ()
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Christopher Sprague: Rochester Institute of Technology
Jeffrey Wagner: Rochester Institute of Technology

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 1, 550-557

Abstract: Some software developers sponsor bug bounty programs, whereby outside parties with comparatively lower costs are compensated for finding bugs. We propose a basic model of why some developers offer bounties while others don't, and why those that do offer bounties typically outsource only a portion of the bug-finding. Our relatively basic framework and preliminary result can support further investigation of public policy instruments, such as products liability law, aimed at modulating software failures that may have large public impacts.

Keywords: Bug bounty; software bug bounties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03-23
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