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Access to Finance for French Firms: Do boardroom attributes matter?

Ramzi Benkraiem (), Amal Hamrouni (), Anthony Miloudi () and Ali Uyar ()
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Ramzi Benkraiem: Audencia Business School
Amal Hamrouni: CRM La Rochelle Business School & CEREGE University of Poitiers
Ali Uyar: CRM La Rochelle Business School

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 3, 1267-1278

Abstract: This article aims at studying the influence of boardroom attributes on access to leverage in the French context. The empirical findings lead to several interesting results. They reveal a negative relation between the number of female directors on the board and the total and long-term leverage ratios. Due likely to the risk aversion of women, firms with more gender-diverse boards appear to use less levels of debt. This is consistent with the pecking order theory. The results also show that the size of the board, the frequency of its meetings and the average age of its independent directors positively affect the leverage ratios. They are coherent with the disciplinary role of the board stipulated by the agency theory.

Keywords: Financing policy; boardroom attributes; leverage; France. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-18
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Working Paper: Access to Finance for French Firms: Do boardroom attributes matter? (2018)
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