Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence

Gordon Klein

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 3, 1918-1924

Abstract: This study evaluates the success of the introduction of corporate leniency programs against cartels, tackling one key problem in the existing literature of leniency program evaluation: the measurement of the effects of leniency programs on the population of detected and undetected cartels. In contrast to previous studies, the present work does not rely on strong assumptions, based on the predictions of theoretical models, to infer conclusions on the population of undetected cartels from the behavior of detected cartels. Rather, it uses a standard competition intensity measure at the industry level and identifies a significant effect of deterrence in the population of both detected and undetected cartels.

Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; Leniency Program; Program Evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I3-P180.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00543

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().