Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: An Extension

Madhuparna Ganguly () and Rupayan Pal
Additional contact information
Madhuparna Ganguly: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 1, 207-213

Abstract: This note shows that the argument of Šaljanin(2017) [Šaljanin, 2017. “Signaling through public antitrust enforcement†, Economics Letters 169, 4 – 6] that public antitrust enforcement complements private investment is robust to allowing public investment in anti-trust enforcement to be productive. However, unlike as in the case of unproductive public investment, over investment in public antitrust enforcement does not necessarily signal that the government is pro-competition: in pooling equilibria either only the anti-competition government or both types of government over invests, whereas in the separating equilibrium only the pro-competition government over invests.

Keywords: Private and public enforcement; Signaling; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 K1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I1-P22.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00546

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().