Collaboration Networks in a Hotelling Game

Fabio Di Dio () and Luca Correani ()
Additional contact information
Luca Correani: Tuscia University in Viterbo

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 1, 127-141

Abstract: The paper investigates the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration in a three-firm Hotelling game. Firms are assumed to be horizontally and vertically differentiated and to provide public services where price is thus set by the regulator. We show that firm-quality effort decreases with the number of links. Nonetheless, a conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. We show that the complete network is uniquely stable but efficient only for a sufficiently low level of spillover rate. As a result, an over-connection problem may arise. However, for high spillover rates, the welfare-superior networks tend to be denser provided that the horizontal differentiation is low.

Keywords: Networks; Hotelling; Product Differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I1-P14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00565

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().