A note on Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: Strategic use of corporate social responsibility

Ajay Sharma

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 4, 1720-1726

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.

Keywords: Stackelberg outcome; Corporate social responsibility; Cournot game; Duopoly; Non-profit orientation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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