Transparency in repeated procurement: when hiding is better

Berardino Cesi () and Adriano Di Natale ()
Additional contact information
Berardino Cesi: University of Rome Tor Vergata
Adriano Di Natale: University of Rome Tor Vergata

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 1, 14-23

Abstract: In this paper we study the effect of transparency on the willingness to collude in repeated procurement competitive tenderings. We allow the buyer to postpone the revelation of the winner's identity and show that such a policy may make collusive agreements less stable in both simultaneous and sequential competitive procedures. When the buyer postpones the revelation of the winner's identity in a scenario in which colluding and "honest" (never colluding) firms participate to the same tendering, the threat of a retaliation, by means of an aggressive bidding by the colluding firms, is weakened and collusion is less stable

Keywords: repeated procurement; collusion; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I1-P3.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00837

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().