Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability

David Wettstein () and Ori Zax
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David Wettstein: Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University

Economics Bulletin, 2018, vol. 38, issue 4, 2509-2514

Abstract: We analyze promotion policy when workers are privately informed regarding their abilities at the outset of their careers. We show that the resulting equilibrium outcomes coincide with the outcomes derived in the standard promotion framework where workers and firms do not possess private information at the start of their relationship (Waldman 1984).

Keywords: promotions; job ladders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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