NFL Salary Cap Allocation: Matching Theory with Observed Behavior
Christopher Jeffords () and
Todd Potts ()
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Todd Potts: IUP
Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 1, 270-279
Using a representative agent optimization model, we assess the degree to which average team salary cap shares devoted to offense and defense in the National Football League (NFL) are consistent with the shares predicted by a constrained optimization model. Results from a balanced fixed-effects panel for all thirty-two NFL teams over a 13-year period (2002-2009 and 2012-2016) indicate that the model is effective at matching the salary cap allocation between offense and defense, and closely matches the ratio of offensive to defensive cap shares that we see in practice. Overall, the model fits well with observed NFL managerial oversight in this respect.
Keywords: NFL; Salary Cap; Management; Optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J4 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00915
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