Evaluating the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program

Lucas Pinha () and Marcelo Braga
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Lucas Pinha: Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 3, 1860-1869

Abstract: This paper sets out to verify if the Brazilian Leniency Program is effective in fighting cartels. The literature has already confirmed the effectiveness of leniency programs in the United States and European Union, but little is known about their effects in emerging countries. A theoretical model provides the long-term prediction of the implementation of an effective leniency program: the average hazard of cartel dissolution increases in the long-run when compared to the short-run. A competing risk model for cartels judged between 1996 and 2017 was estimated, allowing the cartel to end naturally or through antitrust intervention. It was found that the Brazilian Leniency Program is effective in increasing the hazard of cartel dissolution in the long-run, thereby confirming that this policy is effective in destabilizing cartels in Brazil. As fighting cartels is a major concern in Brazil and worldwide, an understanding of the effects of leniency programs is crucial to promoting a competitive environment and preventing anticompetitive activities.

Keywords: Brazilian Leniency Program; antitrust; cartels; hazard of cartel dissolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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