Note on terrorist factions and their interactions with governments

Artyom Jelnov

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 2, 1318-1326

Abstract: This paper studies interactions between governments and non-state terrorist organizations. A terrorist organization consists of two factions, referred to herein as ``politicians'' and ``militants.'' Politicians negotiate with the government. However, extremist militants reject the negotiation, and attempt attacks on the government. If politicians decide to take action against the militants, it is probable that these attempts can be prevented. At a high cost, the government may also take action against the militants, which also harms the politicians. It may be that politicians are better off where militants are stronger.

Keywords: terrorism; factions; negotiation; militants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-31
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