Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem under Strategic Voting

Naruto Nagaoka ()
Additional contact information
Naruto Nagaoka: Kobe Gakuin University

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 4, 2688-2696

Abstract: The Condorcet jury theorem states that if members' voting probabilities for the better alternative are identical and independent among members, and larger than 1/2, then the probability that a committee under simple majority voting chooses the better alternative is monotonically increasing in the committee size. This implies that the committee under simple majority voting decides more efficiently than single-person decision-making. This superiority of group decision-making under strategic voting for the binary signal model has already been demonstrated. We generalize this result and prove that the monotonicity property in the Condorcet jury theorem holds in the symmetric efficient equilibrium.

Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem; decision-making in committees; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I4-P250.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00343

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().