Capacity choice and optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly
Jorge FernÃ¡ndez-Ruiz ()
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Jorge FernÃ¡ndez-Ruiz: El Colegio de MÃ©xico
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jorge Fernández-Ruiz
Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 4, 2751-2765
We examine a mixed duopoly where the degree of privatization of a public firm is set before firms choose their capacity scales and then choose their outputs. We find that the public firm chooses over-capacity for high degrees of privatization and under-capacity for low degrees of privatization, while the private firm always chooses over-capacity. We then find that the optimal degree of privatization of the public firm depends non-monotonically on its relative inefficiency: it is low for small or large levels of inefficiency and it is high for intermediate levels of inefficiency. We finally show that, given the optimal degree of privatization, the public firm may choose over-capacity or under-capacity, and that this choice also depends non-monotonically on its relative inefficiency.
Keywords: Mixed duopoly; capacity choice; optimal privatization; partial privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L3 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00770
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