Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

Economics Bulletin, 2021, vol. 41, issue 1, 66-84

Abstract: In this paper, we consider college admissions with early decision (ED) using a many-to-one matching model with two periods. As in reality, each student commits to only one college in the ED period and agrees to enroll if admitted. Under responsive and consistent preferences for both colleges and students, we show that there exists no stable matching system, consisting of ED and regular decision (RD) matching rules, which is nonmanipulable via ED quotas by colleges or ED preferences by colleges or students. We also show that when colleges or students have common preferences and each student applies early only to the top-ranked college with respect to her RD preference, then no college has a strict incentive to offer a single-choice ED program. On the other hand, if students compromise in the ED market and make early application to colleges that are not top-ranked, then colleges may become better off when they offer ED programs than when they do not.

Keywords: College admissions; early decision; manipulability; many-to-one matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03-10
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http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2021/Volume0/EB-21-V41-I1-P7.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision (2020)
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