Coalitions of concerned voters: a characterization of the majority rule

Adrian Miroiu ()
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Adrian Miroiu: National School of Political and Administrative Studies

Economics Bulletin, 2020, vol. 40, issue 4, 2717-2722

Abstract: The paper gives a characterization of the simple majority rule by appealing to collections of coalitions of voters called frames. It is proved that consistent, monotonic, anonymous and responsive frames include only coalitions consisting in more than half of the concerned voters. An alternative is selected by the simple majority rule if the coalition of voters who favor it is a member of the frame. The property of responsiveness, a far cry of May's (1952) original axiom, is further discussed and some properties of it are proved.

Keywords: majority rule; consistency; monotonicity; anonymity; responsiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10-12
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