Inefficiency in alternately repeated coordination games with dynastic preferences

Chihiro Morooka ()
Additional contact information
Chihiro Morooka: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Economics Bulletin, 2020, vol. 40, issue 4, 3167-3170

Abstract: This study investigates a specific model of alternately repeated pure coordination games with overlapping generations, where the one-shot game has multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. We consider the case in which the payoff of each player is affected by the outcome after his retirement as well as the outcome during his participation. Unlike the preceding results on alternately repeated coordination games where only the Pareto-efficient outcome is obtained in equilibria, we show that an inefficient equilibrium arises in our model.

Keywords: Overlapping Generations Games; Alternating Moves; Coordination Games; Dynastic Preferences; Inefficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2020/Volume40/EB-20-V40-I4-P277.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-20-01040

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().