A note on Cournot equilibria under incomplete information

Alexey Shvedov

Economics Bulletin, 2022, vol. 42, issue 2, 788 - 792

Abstract: The usual assumptions that underlie the theory of Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information are that the rivals' marginal costs are independently and identically distributed. Using a new mathematical method, this paper shows that the Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists under much more general conditions. An expression of equilibrium solutions is presented. Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information are that the rivals' marginal costs are independently and identically distributed. Using a new mathematical method, this paper shows that the Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists under much more general conditions. An expression of equilibrium solutions is presented.

Keywords: Cournot competition; Equilibrium strategy; Incomplete information; Random variable (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06-30
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