Sequential coordination and input price leadership in bilateral oligopoly

Robin Naylor () and Christian Soegaard
Additional contact information
Robin Naylor: University of Warwick

Economics Bulletin, 2023, vol. 43, issue 2, 1081 - 1087

Abstract: We analyse the leader/follower incentives of upstream suppliers in a bilateral duopoly setting with decentralised bargaining over input prices, showing that upstream suppliers prefer to set prices sequentially rather than simultaneously. We characterise equilibria involving sequential coordination demonstrating that there is a first mover advantage to the upstream supplier with relatively little bargaining power over input price and a second mover advantage to the supplier with relatively greater bargaining power.

Keywords: Sequential coordination; bilateral oligopoly; bargaining; first and second mover advantages. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2023/Volume43/EB-23-V43-I2-P89.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-22-00666

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().