PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games

Fatma Aslan (), Papatya Duman () and Walter Trockel ()
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Fatma Aslan: Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Papatya Duman: Paderborn University
Walter Trockel: Bielefeld University

Economics Bulletin, 2023, vol. 43, issue 3, 1279 - 1285

Abstract: We present in this work the set of partition efficient anticipations, the PEA, that results from our Proposition 1, an analogue for non-balanced TU-games of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, as a non-empty core-analogue for non-balanced TU-games. Our Proposition 2 relates our analysis and the PEA to non-balanced super-additive market games as treated by Inoue (2012). that results from our Proposition 1, an analogue for non-balanced TU-games of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, as a non-empty core-analogue for non-balanced TU-games. Our Proposition 2 relates our analysis and the PEA to non-balanced super-additive market games as treated by Inoue (2012). that results from our Proposition 1, an analogue for non-balanced TU-games of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, as a non-empty core-analogue for non-balanced TU-games. Our Proposition 2 relates our analysis and the PEA to non-balanced super-additive market games as treated by Inoue (2012).

Keywords: TU-games; (c–) core; cohesive games; super-additivity; Pareto efficiency; partitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09-30
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