Individual rationality conditions of identifying matching costs in transferable utility matching games

Suguru Otani ()
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Suguru Otani: University of Tokyo Market Design Center

Economics Bulletin, 2024, vol. 44, issue 2, 690 - 697

Abstract: The widely applied method for measuring assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game is the matching maximum score estimation proposed by Fox (2010). This article reveals that by combining unmatched agents, transfers, and individual rationality conditions with sufficiently large penalty terms, it's possible to identify the coefficient parameter of a single common constant, i.e., matching costs in the market.

Keywords: Matching; Matching cost; Individual rationality; Identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06-30
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