Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium [Comment]

Montserrat Feré () and Carolina Manzano ()
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Montserrat Feré: Universitat Rovira i Virgili and ECO-SOS

Economics Bulletin, 2024, vol. 44, issue 4, 1333 - 1337

Abstract: In contrast to Dai and Sidiropoulos (2011), we show that the fiscal disciplining effect associated with central bank opacity about the central's political preference parameter present in a Stackelberg equilibrium is never observed in a Nash equilibrium. disciplining effect associated with central bank opacity about the central's political preference parameter present in a Stackelberg equilibrium is never observed in a Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Distortionary taxes; output distortions; central bank transparency (opacity); fiscal disciplining effect. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-30
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