Rawlsian welfare implications of endogenous transfers in a network of bilateral contests

Dripto Bakshi ()
Additional contact information
Dripto Bakshi: Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur

Economics Bulletin, 2025, vol. 45, issue 3, 1610 - 1619

Abstract: This paper explores the Rawlsian welfare implications of endogenous transfers in a three- player- system where one player fights the other two bilaterally. Though such transfers can be welfare improving under certain conditions (explicitly mentioned in the paper), Rawlsian welfare maximization cannot be achieved endogenously via transfers. The welfare maximizing distribution is stable i.e immune to endogenous transfers.

Keywords: Conflict Economics; Game Theory; Endogenous Transfers; Rawlsian Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2025/Volume45/EB-25-V45-I3-P140.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-24-00322

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().