Heterogeneous capital ownership, partial democracy and political support for immigration

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay () and Devashish Mitra ()
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Subhayu Bandyopadhyay: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Devashish Mitra: Syracuse University

Economics Bulletin, 2024, vol. 44, issue 4, 1492 - 1499

Abstract: This paper analyzes and compares equilibrium immigration levels of some popular political economy models in the context of unequal capital holdings. We show that immigration rises (falls) with inequality in a limited (inclusive) democracy where only a small (large) fraction of the population has voting rights. Furthermore, we highlight the similarities between a campaign contributions model and a partial democracy model in terms of their predictions about immigration policy. In particular, we show that extension of voting rights in a partial democracy has qualitatively similar implications on immigration policy as reducing the relative weight on campaign contributions.

Keywords: Legal immigration policy; Inequality in capital ownership; Partial democracy; Voter support for immigration; Campaign contributions; Lobbying. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-30
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