Valence, abstention, and electoral competition

David Yi ()
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David Yi: Xavier University

Economics Bulletin, 2025, vol. 45, issue 1, 434 - 445

Abstract: We present a simple two-candidate electoral competition model in which one candidate has a valence advantage and voters have option to abstain. We show that complete policy convergence and complete policy divergence as well as partial policy divergence arise as pure strategy Nash equilibria when certain conditions between valence advantage and abstention rates are satisfied. These results highlight the importance of understanding the interactions between the valence advantage and voter abstention in understanding candidates strategic behavior in electoral competition.

Keywords: Electoral Competition; Valence Advantage; Abstention Rate; Policy Divergence; Policy Convergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03-30
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