Establishing ownership in a lobbying contest with asymmetric information

Haruki Miyashita ()
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Haruki Miyashita: Department of Economics, Josai University

Economics Bulletin, 2025, vol. 45, issue 3, 1538 - 1543

Abstract: We construct an incomplete information-lobbying contest involving a defender of economic interest and an exploiter. The parameters of each lobbyist are characterized such that the defenders' interests are secured without competition. The findings reveal that the ownership of vested interests can be established without third-party arbitration when the defender's preference parameter exceeds a certain threshold, provided that the exploiter's contest competitiveness remains below a fixed level.

Keywords: Defender-exploiter game; Asymmetric information; Securing economic rents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-30
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