Endogenous coalitions formations through technology transfers and fair prices

Helene Ferrer (), Guillermo Owen () and Fabrice Valognes ()
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Helene Ferrer: Université de Caen Normandie, CNRS, Normandie Univ, CREM UMR6211
Guillermo Owen: Naval Postgraduate School
Fabrice Valognes: Université de Caen Normandie, CNRS, Normandie Univ, CREM UMR6211

Economics Bulletin, 2026, vol. 46, issue 1, 198 - 208

Abstract: We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Dreze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these "licensing coalitions".

Keywords: Cooperative games; coalitions formation; Aumann-Dreze prices; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03-30
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